A new NATO (or, maybe just an improved one) by Trainor, Stephen C.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1991-04






(Or, maybe just an improved one)
00
A Paper
Presented to the Faculty
of
The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy
by
Stephen C. Trainor
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the




C. ,llltitl~' ! l/ li il fil
I=m m = ln m ~ llmlilmmln l m g l~ lm
A NEW NATO .
(Or, maybe just an improved one)
If we open a quarrel between the past and the present, we shall
find we have lost the future.
Winston Churchill (1874-1965)'
The notion prcNetettd by Sir winstoni Churcnill's quotation provides a
necessary pause for any study on the changing structure of the European
security regime. It causes one to reflect on the momentous events of the last
two years in a somewhat different light !nstead of wallowing in a quagmire
of comparison and modeling efforts in order to determine why war is now
more likely in Europe, or how ineffective the present security regimes will be
in the face of recent changes.2 why are there not more substantive efforts to
seize the initiative and proactively establish a framework for security in Europe
as revolutionary as the recent phenomena in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union,
and Germany.
'Winston Churchill, House of Commons Speech, 1940, in The Speakers
Book of Quotations, ed. Henry 0. Dormann (New York: Fawcett Columbine,
1987), 90.
2See Coral Bell, "Why Russia Should Join NATO," The National Interest
(Winter 1990/91): 37-47, for a comparison of the emerging situation in Europe
to the Concert of Europe of 1815.
See also, John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe
After the Cold War," International Security 15 (Summer 1990): 5-56, for an
analysis of the dangers of the emerging European multipolarity in contrast to
both 1914 and 1939.
2This paper proposes what is at present needed in Europe is a significant
revision in the way security issues are perceived and managed. However,
owing to the realities of the international system and the definite souring in
the "Spirit of 1989," this writer intends to rein in this paper's focus and
concentrate on a subject equally as important as peaceful democratic change is
to the "New World Order," but far less spectacular.' Therefore, this paper will
address the changes .,quired in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in order to inake it more cciesive as an international iegime and
more responsive to the future dimensions of security in Europe. The means
by which such cohesion can be built within NATO is through the effective
practice of consultation. This paper will demonstrate, by examination of
official NATO statements and the actual practice of its members, that NATO
has developed the necessary framework within which the action of effective
consultation may take place. Second, this paper will recommend specific
chainges in structure and procedure which this writer believes will improve the
alliance's consultative efficacy allow NATO to contibute more significantly to
the future security of Europe.
The recent political and social changes which have enveloped the
3President George Bush, "NATO and the US Commitment to Europe,"
Commencement Address at Oklahoma State University, 4 May 1990,
Department of State Current Policy 1276 (May 1990): 2.
President George Bush, "Toward a New World Order," Address before
a inint ,essior of Congess, Washington, D.C., II September 1990, US
Department of State Dispatch 1, no. 3 (17 September 1990): 91-94.
3Central and Eastern European states and the Soviet Union can be viewed as a
major catalyst in the drive to bring about a change in the present security
structures of NATO. However, there are many more substantive issues to be
addressed in this regard than solely change in NATO's structure resulting from
the disappearance of a former adversary. Collective security concerns for
Europe and North America, in addition to traditional collective defense
provided by NATO, must be equally focused on the future uncertainties and
threats posed by, but not limited to, ethnic and nationalist divisiveness,
environmental interests, economic interdependence and instability, proliferation
of war material, arms control aiitiatives, and terrorism. Now, more than ever,
collective security as an ideal must be equally military, economic, and political
in nature. And now, more than ever, NATO must involve itself in each of
these areas to contribute more to the collective security of Europe itself.
It is assumed by this writer that, for the present time, the North Atlantic
Alliance is an effective component of the European security equation. The
basis for this argument is presented in the following declarations:
(a) NATO has won the Cold War and, as such, its effectiveness and
success in doing so must be considered as profound enough to
merit retention as representative of the dominant social system of
modern Europe, that of democracy and the free-market;
b) The structure of NATO possesses the necessary elements for an
expanded role in ie forMidation of security issues in Europe,
equality of arms, consultation procedures, and conscas decision-
making; (c) The maintenance of NATO is the most viable means
by which the United States can exercise infliuerce and 7ontinue it-
ties to Europe;
(d) NATO as a collective defense agreement still asserts some viability
in the face of challenges to existing and emerging threats to
4Western interests."
First, this paper will define briefly what is required in terms of basic
regime theory to support the development of an effective framework for the
embodiment of alliance security interests. Second, an analysis of the historical
basis of consultation in NATO will be conducted within the model of regime
theory as presented in the first section. Third, an examination of four
important crisis situations will serve to shape an understanding of consultation
within the context of actual practice. Based upon this analysis and
examination, a general evaluation of the effectiveness of consultation and
cooperation in NATO will be provided. Finally, recommendations will be
made for improvements in the structure of NATO that will help to bring about
a proactive environment of change in Europe, thus completing the rejoinder
from the West to the "Revolution of 1989."
REGIME THEORY
In order to better understand how effective the consultation process in
NATO has come to be, it is imperative to distinguish the term "consultation"
from "negotiation," in the sense that it is applicable to NATO. In a study on
'See Ngw York Times. 15-20 Febriary 1091 and onward -garcins
controversy over Top Levei Equipment (ILE) and implementation of the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe(CFE) agreement. See also New York
Times, 21-24 April 1991 regarding challenges to Soviet President Gorbachev's
leadership and increasing calls for a return to hard-line rule.
5political consultation in NATO, Roger Hill5 describes consultation as a
"situation in which persons are conferring or conversing in order to impart
information, exchange views, obtain reactions, or decide something."6 This idea
of consultation is set apart from negotiation even further, in that there is an
assumption of common interests over a certain range of subjects; a common
purpose: and common ultimate goals. This notion of interests, purpose, and
goals and the very action of consultation is closely related to the model
presented by Stephen Krasner in his study of regimes.7
For the purposes of this paper, the regime theory model developed by
Krasner, may be interposed as a set of principles, norms, rules, and procedures
guiding the behavior of Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty. The principles
and norms directing the North Atlantic Alliance are based in Western
democratic ideals and liberal capitalism; whereas, the rules and procedures
allowing the alliance to function effectively are based upon the ideas of
collective defense and consultation. Thus, from Krasner's model and Hill's
description of consultation one concludes that the act of consultation, while an
essential procedure of this regime, also serves as the basis for bringing together
Parties espousing common values, interests, and behavioral systems, or, as
'A member of the NATO Secretariat for five years.
6R. J. Hill, Political Consultation in NATO, (Ottawa: Operational Research
and Analysis Esiablishment, Department of National Defence, 1975), 2.
7Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 1983), 20.
6Krasner has described them, the principles and norms of the regime.
HISTORICAL BASIS OF CONSULTATION
Western Europe and North America came together in a political and
military union after World War II for two fundamental reasons. The first
reason was to provide a political and military counterbalance to the power of
the Soviet Union in Europe. The Second was to create a structure within
which the nations of Western Furope and their North American Allies, Canada
and the United States, could promote peaceful and productive relationships
among themselves, bringing to an end the cycles of internal conflict that had
produced two world wars in the 20th century!
The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April of 1949 as the political
framework for an international alliance designed to "prevent aggression, or to
repel it, should it occur".9 The treaty provides for continuous cooperation and
consultation in political, economic, and military fields. In the North Atlantic
Treaty, the idea of consultation is first addressed in Article 2, whereby the
Parties to the Treaty will:
contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing
about a better understanding of the principles upon which these
'NATO In The 1990's: Special Report of the North Atlantic Assembly,
1988, 17.
9
"The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO
Information Service, 1989), 13.
7institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and
well-being."
Furthermore, Article 4 provides for the mandatory consultation between
the Parties whenever any of them deems that "the territorial integrity, political
independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened (emphasis added)."
Unlike many international agreements, NATO members can determine what
constitutes a threat to the peace individually and call upon collective
consultations within the alliance.
The consultation provision is facilitated by the establishment of a
permanent structure for the implementation and maintenance of the Treaty.
This structure is provided for in Article 9 and creates a "Council, on which
each of them [members of NATO] shall be represented. '"'z Furthermore,
Article 9 requires that the "Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet
promptly at any time."3 Thus, understanding that the central purpose of the
Alliance is the collective defense of the member states, the only means for
determining a threat to one of the Parties, short of a direct attack, is through
the consultation provided in Article 4 and in the permanent structure created
by Article 9. Additionally, the objective of developing peaceful relations by






8of NATO consultations to include a mynad of issu,., ranging from defense and
politics to economics and the environment
The forms of consultation in NATO vary greatly and depend upon the
circumstances in which they are used. These forms range from the most
customary declarations and resolutions presented by Heads of State or Foreign
Ministers at Ministerial Council Meetings to the least formal associations and
ad hoc gatherings in the passageways of NATO Headquarters. In any
manner, consultation in NATO involves any number of the following actions:
(1) Imparting information unilaterally, exchanging information bilaterally
or muiiaterally;
(2) Notifying others of national decisions already taken, but without
expecting any reaction on their parts;
(3) Notifying others of decisions already taken, in such a way as to
build consent for them;
(4) Consulting in advance on national actions that affect the interests of
others;
(5) Consulting internationally to ascertain in advance the possible
reaction to a national decision not yet made (that is, as an input
to the national decision itself);
(6) Consulting in advance on a matter lending itself to separate parallel
national actions by othcrs;
(7) Consulting for the purpose o; a1r-ving at a decision which by its
nature must be taken or - .- - nto action collectively.1
5
Based on this exhaustive list, it is easy to see how consultation has come to
include such a wide range of issue areas, and why the enormous potential
1
4See Roger Hill, Political Consultation in NATO: Parliamentary and
Policy Aspects, (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment,
Department of National Defence, 1975), for a detailed study of the actual
interaction between members of NATO.
"Harlan Cleveland, NATO: The Transatlantic Bargain (New York: Harper
and Row, 1970), 19.
9exists within the conduct of consultation to strengthen international regimes
such as NATO. Consultation as a form af inter-allied diplomacy complements
that which alliance members conduct between themselves bilaterally and
multilaterally and, combined with state-to-state relations, makes up the regional
foreign policy of each of these states.
Contrary to what many might believe, decision-making in the North
Atlantic Council is not its most important function. Instead, the primary role
is the exchange of information and assessments, the analysis of intelligence,
and the ability to "foster consultation and contingency planning so that
confidence among the allies can be generated, differences in perception
narrowed, and the basis laid for rapid, coordinated action should the necessity
arise.""6 Thus, conclusions drawn from this section are, first, that consultation
exists as the primary diplomatic activity between members of the North
Atlantic Council and, second, that the very practice of consultation results in
the strengthening of a regime's (such as N \TO's) political structure.
CONSULTATION IN PRACTICE
The practice of consultation has evolved during the more than four
decades of NATO's existence and has been expanded and refined in a number
of significant Council efforts. In 1952, the Council in Permanent Session
6Peyton V. Lyon, NATO as a Diplomatic Instrument, (Toronto: The
Atlantic Council of Canada, 1970), 12.
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replaced the Council Deputies and, subsequently, became the primary organ for
diplomatic exchange between members ot the alliance in the absence of
Foreign Ministers and Heads of State. The first major revision of NATO's
doctrine on cooperation and consultation was undertaken in May 1956, with
the creation of the Conumittee on Non-Military Cooperation."' Also termed the
report ol the "Three Wise Men," after the members of the committee, Gaetano
Martino of Italy, Halyard Lange of Norway, and Lester B. Pearson of Canada,
th. committee sought to improve consultation within the alliance in light of
difficulties resulting from attempts to establish a European Defence Community
(EDC), settlement of the German auestion, and some early burden-sharing
debates.
In the report of the "Three Wise Men," specific recommendations
relative to procedures for Foreign Ministers' Meetings and the need for a
Committee of Political Advisors to the Permanent Representatives werc
advanced' 9 The report also addressed, for the first time, the idea of an
"Atlantic Community" embodied in the coming together of NATO nations.
This embodiment was the basis for the growth of NATO into an organization
"
7The North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Facts nd Figures (Brussels:
NATO Information Service, 1989), 31.
"See Robert S. Jordan, ed., Gcnerals in International Politics: NATO's
Sup.eme ALlied Commander Europe (Lexington, KY: University Press of
Kentucky, 1987), 57-64, for a review of these issues during General Alfred
Gruenther's tenure as SACiUR (1953-1956).
"'Thomas Kennedy, Jr., NATO Political-Military Consultation (Washington,
DC: National Defense University Press, 1984) 9.
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designed to serve and protect the common Atlantic ,,terests, and was described
as follows:
...the development of an Atlantic Community whose roots are deeper
even than the necessity for common defence. This implies nothing less
than the permanent association of the free Atlantic peoples for the
promotion of their greater unity and the protection and the advancement
of the interests which, as free democracies, they have in common.2"
The impetus for inaugurating the Committee of Three was strikingly
similar to everts which have recently brought to the fore a question of the
utility and durability of NATO. The report of the "Three Wise Men", in many
respects, holds as great an impact for decisions regarding NATO's future today,
as in 1956. The committee was e:,,ablished as a response to claims that NATO
was no longer necessary in light of Stalin's death in 1953 and the subsequent
overtures elicited by Khrushchev for a "peaceful coexistence" with the West.
Some of the claims presented by critics, against NATO's continuation in 1956,
which appear to have a rather timeless quality include, "the pooling of strength
ai J resourc--...in defense of imperial privileges: and an Atlantic hegemony
,ndcr I eadership ot the United States."" Following the dramatic events of
1989 there have been innumerable occasions in which the efficacy of NATO
has been dended for reasons quite similar to those presented in 1956.'
2
'NATO: Facts and Fg [e, 387.
21Ibid, 388.
22See Pierre Hassner, "Europe beyond partition and unity: disintegration or
reconstitution?," International Affairs(U.KU 63 (June 1990): 461-475.
See also Jack Snyder, "Averting Anarchy in the New Europe,"
(continued...)
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The need for modification and improvement in the functioning of
NATO is by no means disputed, however a complete dismantling of the
organization because of incomplete changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, a direct result of NATO's very existence, seems foolish at best As
Admiral "Bud" Edney, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, has stated, "A
wise man does not throw away his overcoat on the first warm day of spring."23
Likewise, the report of the "Three Wise Men," adopted in December 1956, one
month after the Soviet Union violently crushed the uprising in Hungary, stated
that:
...NATO can show that it is more than a defence organisation acting and
reacting to the ebb and flow of the fears and dangers arising out of
Soviet policy. It can prove its desire to cooperate fully with other
members of the international community in bringing to reality the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations. It can show that it is
not merely concerned with preventing the cold war from deteriorating
into a shooting one; or with defending itself if such a tragedy should
take place, but that it is even more concerned with seizing the political
and moral initiative to enable all countries to develop in freedom, and to
bring about a secure peace for all nations emphasis addedl.2"
The enlightened thinking of the Committee on Non-Military Cooperation was
0 offered in 1956 and it remains equally applicable to the principles embraced by
the West today. It is this writer's belief that the report of the "Three Wise
'
2(...continued)
International Security 14 (Spring 1990): 5-41.
See also Admiral Sir Peter Stanford, "NATO Must Go," Proceeding
(March 1991): 36-40.
"Admiral L.A. Edney, SACLANT, "The Importance of the Atlantic to
NATO in Changing Times," Jane's NATO Handbook 1990-1991, 147.
24NATO Facts and Figures, 388.
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Men" stands as a tribute to the enduring character of the principles on which
the North Atlantic Alliance was founded.
This same report also brought forward the concept, found in the
development of the post-war nuclear world, that nations would be unable to
rely solely on national power and policy for survival. The increasing
interdependence of states politically, economically, and militarily was viewed as
the justification for an increasing amount of international cohesion and
cooperation at that time.2" Once again, recognizing the shrinking nature of the
globe politically, economically, and environmentally; and the broadening of the
world's vulnerability to military threats, the ideas presented in 1956 seem as
relevant today as they were nearly thirty-five years ago.
The justification for an increased importance being placed on the
consultation process can be found in paragraph 42 of the report of the "Three
Wise Men." The report recognizes the extreme difficulty in bringing about
effecti , , onsultation, but states that with proper conviction it will become:
...more than exchange of information, though that is necessary.
IConsultation] means more than letting the NATO Council know about
national decisions that have already been taken; or trying to enlist
support for those decisions. It means the discussion of problems
collectively, in the early stages of policy formation, and before national
positions become fixed. At best, this will result in collective decisions
on matters of common interest affecting the Alliance. At the least, it
will ensure that no action is taken by one member without a knowledge





The solid basis of the report of the Committee on Non-Military
Cooperation served to broaden the scope of consultation within the Atlantic
Alliance and functioned as the primary elaboration of this issue until the mid-
sixties when the mission and further existence of the organization were called
into question again. This time the 1967 report on The Future Tasks of the
Alliance (more commonly known as the Harmel Report) served to instill a
renewed and expanded purpose to the alliance in light of several significant
and trying events occurring at this time. 7 These events included, the
movement of the Alliance Headquarters to Belgium following France's decision
to leave the military structure of NATO; the revision of NATO's nuclear
strategy, which adopted the concept of Flexible Response, based upon an
adaptable and balanced range of responses, conventional and nuclear, to all
levels of aggression or threats of aggression; an increased tension within the
Alliance as a result of crises, such as, between Greece and Turkey in Cyprus;
and the increasing public and diplomatic criticism of the role of the United
States in Indo-China."
Against this backdrop emerged another attempt to improve the
consultative functions of the Alliance in the Harmel Report This report
2
'lbid, 403.
2 See Robert S. Jordan and Werner Feld, Europe in The Balance: The
Changing Context of European International Politics (London: Faber and
Faber, 1986), 215-233, for a discussion on intra-regional political and military
cohesiveness in NATO.
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sought to promote the "dualism of maintaining peace (by military means) and
creating peace (through an active policy of detente)."29 The report went even
further to engage a dissertation on the importance of consultation to the actual
process envisioned in NATO:
As sovereign states the Allies are not obliged to subordinate their
policies to collective decision. The Alliance affords an effective forum
and clearing house for the exchange of information and views; thus,
each Ally can decide its policy in the light of close knowledge of the
problems and objectives of the others. To this end the practice of frank
and timely consultations needs to be deepened and improved...The
chances of success will clearly be greater if the Allies remain on parallel
courses, especially in matters of close concern to them all; their actions
will thus be all the more effective?
The Harmel Report went on to emphasize the issue of NATO's global
responsibility, which was also addressed in the report of the "Three Wise Men"
in 1956. Paragraph 32 of the 1956 document and paragraph 15 of the 1967
document stress the importance of NATO's global responsibilities within the
realm of the United Nations and the "broader interests of the whole
international community."" These statements serve as the basis of justification
that NATO is not a island isolated in its interests.
The next significant document, which addressed consultation within
NATO, was the Ottawa Declaration of June 1974.' This Declaration, as the
"Joachim Brockpahler, "The Harmel Philosophy: NATO's creative strategy
for peace," NATO Review (December 1990): 19.




previous reports, emerged amidst a flurry of international controversies, this
time concerning the developing bilateral relationship between the United States
and the Soviet Union on strategic nuclear wea, .s; the Watergate Scandal in
the United States; and the firsi Middle East Oil Crisis following the 1973
Arab-Israeli War. These critical events served to focus the sights of alliance
members on the issue of consultation even greater than before, as it became
evident that their interests were becoming more entwined and increasingly
vulnerable to other allies' actions.
The Ottawa Declaration specifically moved to regain NATO's political
balance by reinforcing the obligation for consultation in the following manner:
The Allies... are firmly resolved to keep each other fully informed and to
strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations by all means
which may be appropriate on matters relating to their common interests
as members of the Alliance, bearing in mind that these interests can be
affected by events in other areas of the world.33
The idea of "frank and timely discussions" emerged as a key statement in both
the Harmel Report and the Ottawa Declaration and indicated a definite
emphasis on pre-consultation in circumstances impacting alliance interests.
Finally, during last summer's London Summit, NATO moved even closer
toward the achievement of its stated goals of "seizing the political and moral
initiative., to bring about a secure peace for all nations" with the profound
elaboration of its willingness to enhance the functions of the alliance, and yet
promote change and development in Europe through complementary
"Ibid, 406.
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institutions.3' At the North Atlantic Alliance London Summit of 5-6 July 1990,
the Heads of State of the alliance members declared several bold, new
initiatives and redefined alliance objectives which reflect both the internal
changes of NATO and the external changes in Europe. Those changes were
intended to serve as the foundation for the emergence of any future security
regime in Europe.
It was declared that the "Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe (CSCE) should become more prominent in Europe's future through
institutionalization, so as to provide a forum for wider political dialogue in a
more united Europe"35. Within this framework for security in Europe, the
London Declaration goes on to state that, "NATO must continue to exist not
only for the common defense of its members, but to build new partnerships
with all the nations of Europe".' The Declaration provides that the alliance
will achieve these objectives, in part, through the maintenance of security and
stability militarily, but equally by enhancing the political component of the
alliance."7
The London Declaration and the December 1990 Ministerial
Communique each seek to enhance the political component of the alliance
'"London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance," NATO





found in Article 2 of the 1949 Treaty, and reinforce the security link between
North America and Europe "as a framework for broad co-operation among
ourselves "8 Further, the alliance sets forth a revised objective for the coming
years as NATO will "remain both an anchor of stability and an agent of
change."39
Some additional changes to the structure of European security appear to
be emerging from this latest NATO Communique, regarding the leadership of
the alliance. The alliance, in an effort to meet changing conditions, will
strengthen its European pillar with the stated objective of "ensuring a full and
equitable sharing of leadership and responsibilities between Europe and North
America."' This reinforcement comes as a result of the imminent drawdown
of U.S. forces from the continent; the unification of Germany, and the
subsequent leadership role it will play in Europe; and the changing economic
balance of the United States vis-a-vis the European Community of 1992.'
One can conclude from these statements that NATO intends to broaden
the scope of cooperation and continually factor in elements of change within
and around its region of interest This, no doubt, involves an acknowledged
3





4 See "The North Atlantic Tryst," The Economist (7 July 1990):10-12, for
an analysis of the EC and its future relationship with NATO.
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increase in the importance of consultation in the development of change in
Europe. This point is evident in the understanding that the European pillar of
the alliance will truly share in the leadership of NATO in the years to come,
diminishing the apparent hegemonic hold the United States has maintained for
four decades.
MORAL AND LEGAL EFFECT OF CONSULTATION IN NATO
In analyzing the development of consultation within the Atlantic
Alliance, one comes to several conclusions regarding the basis for its
establishment, its enduring desirability, and its moral and legal effect. The
establishment of consultation as the primary means of informing allies of policy
and intentions evolved from the benevolent hegemony which the United States
provided NATO from its origins. The allies, being sovereign states, were
interested in fostering the development of relations between one another.
Consultation on security matters was viewed as the most reasonable and
equitable means of achieving this objective.
From the very beginning of the alliance, there existed a constant
struggle between the need to consult ones allies on the one hand and the
desire to assert one's sovereign right to declare unilateral policy initiatives on
the other. This delicate balance was set during the early years of the alliance
and has ebbed and flowed with the changing times ever since. The symmetry
between consultation and sovereignty has been influenced directly by the
20
issuance of each of the major policy directives discussed in the preceding
section and by several regional and global crises and policies which will be
examined in the following section.
There lies a question as to whether or not NATO's consultation process,
provided for in the Treaty and subsequent reports and declarations, has
established a legal or moral norm, through the codification of the ideas and
practice of the states. If it has not, then has the imperative to consult within
the Alliance evolved exclusively into a circumstantial moral imperative instead?
The entire legal/moral issue of consultation can be viewed in light of
the regime theory model prcviously discussed. The characterization of a moral
or legal obligation to consult can be determined with ease, if, by using Alan
Henrikson's descriptions, the consultation embodies:
norms - explicit standards of international behavior that articulate
general rights and obligations;
rules - which are more specific prescriptions and prohibitions requiring
or forbidding the performance of specific actions and sometimes
stipulating benefits to be gained or penalties to be suffered; or,
procedures - the institutional practices and diplomatic methods used in
making and implementing collective decisions within international
organizations and other multilateral groupings."
As stated previously, Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty lays out the
obligation to consult allies, not only when a threat is perceived by one of
them, but also prior to undertaking any unilateral action outlined in Article 5
4
'Alan K Henrikson, ed., Negotiating World Order: The Artisanship and
Architecture of Global Diplomacy, (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources,
1986), xvii.
21
of the Treaty. This conclusion has been reached because one discovers that
the provision calling for consultation (Article 4) lies immediately before the
provision authorizing unilateral action (Article 5).3 Furthermore, a resort to
unilateral action could have serious implications for allies and, therefore,
should be assumed to provide for the expression of interests before any such
action is taken.
Additionally, the need to consult allies in the event an action's
consequences would have a direct, adverse affect on the alliance's ability to
defend against an attack external to the treaty area, or might profoundly
strengthen the military capacity of a possible threat to the alliance, is also
determined to be "an obligatory norm.' This norm is represented by the
obligation, on parties, to consult before denouncing the treaty or modifying
significantly the capabilities of the alliance under the treaty (Article 12). This
could be construed to include many recurring consultations in NATO that have
become accepted as standard practice, such as, annual budget procedures;
consultation prior to extraordinary force reductions by any member; the U.S.
practice of consulting before appointing Allied Commanders, in particular,
SACEUR; and the practice established by President Nixon and continued by
Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan regarding consultation before undertaking
43Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., "NATO Consultations as a Component of National
Decisionmaking," American Journal of International Law 73 (July 1979): 375.
"Kirgis, 404-406.
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arms control negotiations of particular concern to the European allies."5
These nornis and practices clearly express an obligation to consult in the
above outlined instances. However, the need to consult "before an initial
decision is made, even if the decision establishes a general course of action
that is irreversible for all practical purposes" is not mandatory.' Secondly,
consultations are required, "as feasible," when a State's action could result in
an armed engagement with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, there is no
obligatory norm to consult in the event that a member's crisis decision-making
might be adversely affected."7
One can assume that a failure to consult, while not being liable to any
official enforcement or punishment, will likely result in the decision or action
in question to be severely criticized or disregarded, in principle, by the
remainder of the alliance. That is, unless, the outcome of the unilateral
decision is generally favorable and it is apparent that prior consultation would
have been prejudicial to successful action."
Thus, one can judge that consultation in NATO is a norm only to the
extent that the decision taken directly impacts the capabilities of the alliance







to a confrontation with an external threat to the alliance. The remainder of
the consultation taking place within NATO is characterized as diplomatic
"procedure," or the intercourse involved in informing and consulting allies
regarding policy of common concern. Nevertheless, consultation has played a
critical role in advancing the cohesion of the alliance and promoting the
policies which have served as the basis for European security in the Post
World War II era.
CONSULTATION CRISES
This section will address several cases in which consultation was not
employed at all, was not used at the appropriate time, or was not used with
the proper conviction. From the following illustrations one will better
understand what Parties have actually determined to bc within the realm of
the obligatory consultative norm, established by the North Atlantic Treaty; the
subsequent Declarations of 1956, 1967, 1974, and 1990; and the actual practice
of states in the institutionalized framework of the alliance. This examination
will not include an investigation of the more positive instances of consultation
in NATO. Instead, this paper will demonstrate how the Atlantic Alliance has
responded to challenges to the limits of consultation by producing visionary
documents reflecting momentous changes in the relationships between alliance
members. From this analysis, more informed conclusions may be reached
regarding the ability of consultation to continue to reinforce and expand the
24
effectiveness of NATO as a security regime in Europe.
During the last forty years there have been severn! crises which have
critically challenged the ability of NATO to function as a consultative
organization. They have ranged from the unibteral decision by de Gaulle to
withdraw all French armed forces from the organized military structure of
NATO, to the U.S. crisis decision-making in response to the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Each of the events, outlined below, demonstrates the f-ilure of a Party
to undertake consuftation on an issue which, either directly impacted the ability
of the alliance to function, or resulted in a direct threat to the alliance 2.e to
an imminent confrontation with the Soviet Union. The ensuing section will
describe these events briefly and link each one of them to the development of
consultation in NATO. In chronological order, the following crises will be
examined: the Suez Crisis of 1956; the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962; the
French decision to leave the integrated military structure of NATO in 1966;
and the global military alert established by the United States during the 1973
Arab-Israeli War.
Suez Canal. 1956
Following the nationalization of the Suez Canal by Egyptian President
Nasser in July 1956, -.fter the U.S. and Great Britain withdrew financing for
the Aswan High Dam. Creat Britain and France, in company with Israel
launched an attack on Egypt in an attempt to gain control over the canal.
Neither Great Britain nor France informed any of their NA'IO allies of their
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plans to invade Egypt This action took NATO and the entire world by
surprise and led to a So-iet threat to intervene with nuclear weapons, thus
bringing about a severe crisis for all of the alliance members.
The United States, outraged by the invasion itself, but more so by e
lack of prior consultation, immediately denounced the act and pressed the
United Nations for an imposed cease-tire and the eventual implementing of a
UN police force in the area. The outcry within the alliance over this bilateral
action occurred in the days before the violent Soviet invasion of Hungary.
The divisiveness of this issue within NATO stymied the consultative organs and
preempted an effective and coordinated response to the Hungarian crisis.'9
These two very significant events served to strengthen the force of the report
of the "Three Wise Men," when it was endorsed by the North Atlantic Council
at the December 1956 Ministerial Meeting.
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
Althou-h situated beyond the territorial responsibility of the alliance, the
Cuban Missile Crisis presented a situation in which the -very existence of f e
Atlantic Alliance would become dearly threatened, thereby necessi.ating, at a
minimum, political consultation under Article 4 of the Treaty. However, the
limited time frame from discovery to potential activation of the missile sites
(approximately ten days) ultimately led the Kennedy Administration to face the
crisis unilaterally. There may have been a concern that there wvas not enough
'
9Kirgis, 398.
2time to include the opinions of anothei set of leaders, in addition to the
justification that the incident !ay outside of the territorial realm of NATO
consultation.-°
The first notification of NATO allies of a U.S. blockade of Cuba came
only 45 minutes before President Kennedy made his speech of 22 October
1962.' To further exemplify the point that the U.S. considered no obligation
to consult NATO allies, when Dean Acheson was pressed by General de
Gaulle as to whether he was there to consult or inform, Acheson replied that
he was there to inform only. 2
The response of the allies to this action was merely a form of resigned
support for the U.S. blockade. Clearly, resentment existed among the smaller
NATO allies, who had not even been personally informed, but because of its
special relationship as undisputed leader of NATO and the implied immediate
threat to Western security, there was little outright criticism for the failure to
inform and consult during the Cuban Missile Crisis."
Despite the tension created during the crisis itself and the resultant
internal discord, consultation was still preferred by most of the smaller allies as
50 bid.
"Cees Wieber and Bert Zeeman, "I don't need your handkerchiefs':
Holland's experience of crisis consultation in NATO," International Affairs
L.UKJ, 66 (January 1991): 97.
'Ibid, 97.
"Josef, Joffe, The Limited Partnership: Europe. the United States. and the
Burdens of Alliance (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987), 2-3.
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a means to restrain the adventurous spirit of the larger powers, particularly the
U.S., when it came to alliance interests. This approach would allow States to
avoid arbitrary entrapment by a decision and would enable them to distance
themselves from a position they might consider uncomfortable, by voicing
opposition or concerns during Council consultations.' This option remains one
of the most attractive aspects of the consultative process for members of
NATO who have neither substantial military capabilities nor political influence
in the organization.
French withdrawal from the NATO Military Organization. 1966
In March of 1966, without any prior consultation of its allies, General
de Gaulle declared that France would remove all of its armed forces under
NATO command. ' He also announced that all NATO military commands and
headquarters, as well as individual allied military establishments would be
withdrawn from France.5' The French rejected any form of negotiation on the
issue, in direct contravention of the provisions of the 1949 Treaty. The French
not only failed to observe the established consultative procedures provided for
by the Treaty and enhanced in the 1956 Report, but they "arguably breached
the implied North Atlantic Treaty obligation to consult by means of a review
'Wieber and Zeeman, 100.
"French naval forces had already been withdrawn.
'6Allies could have retained facilities in France if placed under French
operational control.
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conference if it wished radically to alter its treaty commitment" 57 However, it
should be noted that the allied responses to this action demonstrated the
alliance's resolve not to acquiesce in the event of an ally's failure to consult.
Thus, the normative character of the obligation to consult was not severely
diminished by the French action."
An upsurge of diplomatic activity occurred at the beginning of the Nixon
Administration, and was highlighted by more intense consultations between
allies, evidenced by the Euro-focused foreign policy of Dr. Kissinger and
reorientation of NATO toward detente following the Harmel Report in 1967.
However, a crisis accentuated, again, the real division between states on the
matter of consultation. The end of U.S. involvement in Indo-China; the British
accession to the Common Market in 1972; and European movement toward
greater union, all marked a period of time in which the United States was
searching to restore its place in the world order. Dr. Kissinger introduced
themes relating to a "New Atlantic Charter" and the "Year of Europe" in, what
some believed was, an effort to create a new bi-polar relationship between the
United States and its European allies. 9
Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War, 1973






American priorities emerged with the announcement of a secretly negotiated
Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union.' The agreement called for consultations between the superpowers in
the event the relations between them or with one of their allies appeared tc
risk nuclear war. The agreement also allowed for the notification of allies
regarding consultations. However, this 2breement resulted in a fear that
superpower consultation ',outd take precedence over that which was provided
for in NATO and, subsequently, caused a great deal of anxiety within NATO
zircles.61
The conditions shifted from bad to worse with the outbreak of the Yom
Kippur War in October 1973 and the split between the U.S. and Europe over
support for Israel and Arab oil supplies. The situation reached crisis
proportions when the U.S., upon learning that the Soviets were readying forces
for possible intervention, effected a global alert of all U.S. forces. While
designed as a signal of American determination and support for Israel to the
Soviet Union, it also served as a severe shock to many NATO allies, who after
having no prior consultation or warning, found U.S. forces readying for a
confrontation with the Soviet Union on their own soiL' The friction between






year due, in part, to differing perceptions of how to address the world oil crisis
and general differences of opinion regarding East-West relations.
It was not until the summer of 1974 ano the change of goventnit&t ill
several European nations', along with the obvious shift in focus of the
embroiled Nixon White House,' that relations improved to previous levels. In
June 1975, the Ottawa Declaration reinforced existing arrangements for mutual
assistance and cooperation through a series of positive consultative practices.
This was an obvious change from what Kissinger's "New Atlantic Charter"
originally foresaw as a radically redefined Atlantic relationship within the
context of a new world order.65 Nonetheless, the Declaration on Atlantic
Relations acted to strengthen U.S. resolve to consult allies and avoid any
situation imperiling them to external political or military pressure, and
"resolved to keep each other fully informed and... strengthen [further] the
practice of frank and timely consultations... on matters relating to their common
interests."'
63French President Pompidou died on 2 April; Portugal experienced a
military coup d'etat on 25 April; Prime Minister Heath resigned 4 March;
Chancellor Brandt resigned 6 May; and the Greek Military government
resigned 23 July.
"Gerald Ford became the 38th President following Richard Nixon's
resignation on 23 July.
'Hill, 24.
'NATO Facts and Figures, 406.
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AN ASSESSMENT OF CONSULTATION IN PRACTICE
From the preceding sections, an appraisal of the effectiveness of
consulpt'on in NATO can be developed, from which an understan!ing of the
general ability of the alliance to meet its stated goals and objectives can be
achieved. This very brief treatment of the development of the consultative
function in NATO and challenges to its enhancement has attempted to focus
on the realities of this modern alliance by presenting the obligation to consult
in its normative sense, and then contrasting against it attempts to assert state
sovereignty, hegemonic domain, or just plain crisis management
This paper has attempted to portray consultation as a norm, set out with
a positive legal basis in the very origins of the North Atlantic Treaty and
reinforced innumerable tinies by declaration and resolution (most notably in
1956, 1967, 1974, and 1990), and then solidified as cu,-o,,iary international law
by the general practice and expectations of states parties to the Treaty. The
delicate balance struck between consultation and sovereignty has travelled the
peaks and valleys of the last four decades. However, a general trend toward
greater reliance upon this idea, as a norm of international behavior, is
observable and is, thus, a general conclusion of this paper.
In consonance with this opinion lies the understanding that relations
within the Atlantic Community will continue to become even more
interdependent as the alliance moves into its fifth decade. This
interdependence is plainly evident in the realms of economics, finance,
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technology, culture, the environment, politics, and defense. Not only has
Western Europe shared the last forty years of history in a defensive alliance
with North America, it also maintains cultural and economic links which are
stronger than bonds between any other states in the world. This, among many
other considerations, should serve as the basis for a continuing relationship
within NATO and presents itself as a logical justification for its continued
maintenance. NATO has proven its ability to adapt to the changing
circumstances of Europe, and even today, is realizing its goal of becoming "an
anchor of stability and an agent of change."
It is important to understand that the changing circumstances which have
fashioned the monumental transformation of Europe, have also profoundly
impacted the balance within the North Atlantic Alliance itself. The United
States will no longer be completely politically, militarily, and economically
preeminent in the region or even vis-a-vis many individual allies. There is no
confusion regarding America's nuclear commitment to the maintenance of
peace in Europe. However, there are new directions and dimensions to
security in Europe (such as the environment and Eastern Europe) which can
be only served or are best served by European states. The United States
understands this and has evidenced a distinct commitment to this new balance
in Europe by encouraging a European lead in the effort to aid the struggling
Democracies of Eastern Europe.67
67
"An expanding universe," 10.
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THE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE
What is most important, however, is that the United States and its
NATO alies seize this immense opportunity. NATO must develop and fortify
the consultative functions of the alliance in concert with the expanding union
of the European Community (EC), the Western European Union (WEU), and
the emergence of a Grand European Security Regime in the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This must first be accomplished
by improving the ties between NATO allies and, second through improved ties
between NATO and other regimes in the region. Strengthening relationships
within Europe will provide all members of this "common home" a stake in its
maintenance. Now is the time for NATO to move beyond collective defense
and become part of a true collective security regime. For if NATO stagnates
its decision in the intransigence of the present Soviet dilemma, it will sooner
than later be asked to step aside. Thereafter, NATO will come to be known
for what it has accomplished, which is astounding in its own right, but not for
what it continues to accomplish.
One cannot make such bold challenges without providing some bold
suggestions as well. The ideas presented below are based on the premise that,
if structural changes are generated which enhance trust and confidence within
NATO, then sincere and significant consultation and cooperation will ensue
within the alliance. This solid development will ensure that NATO is not only
the collective security regime of choice in a democratic Europe, but would give
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it a preeminent position alongside the EC and the CSCE as the one of the
three pillars of Eropean security."
Instead of diffusing the power of the Atlantic Alliance, as some would
profess to do, an effort must be undertaken to consolidate tile strength and
focus the energy of NATO on issues of greatest concern to its members.' The
first means of consolidation would be to alter the Allied Command structure
into a bilateral relationship reflecting the true nature of the Atlantic
partnership.
With the implementation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces
(INF) treaty nearing completion, support from both NATO and the Soviet
Union for talks on Short Range Nuclear Forces (SNF), and the imminent
departure of sizeable numbers of U.S. forces from the continent, now is the
time to creat, a true European Allied Command. It appears as only logical
that NATO should have a dual command structure. This arrangement would
reduce the Channel Command to a subordinate position under the European
Command, reflecting the similar role and importance the Channel possesses
with the Southern Command in the Mediterranean. This change would, thus,
"Pierre Harmel, "The Atlantic Alliance and European Security," The
future of European Security (Paris: Assembly of Western European Union,
1989), 31-35.
'Peter Corterier, "Transforming the Atlantic Alliance," The Washinon
Quartrly (Winter 1991): 38.
'Luc Reychler, ed., "Transforming Western European Security," zilpean
Security Beyond The Year 2000 (New York: Praeger, 1988), 288.
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provide NATO with a solid base from which the ties between North America
and Europe can be strengthened, not divided. Secondly, this formidable
change would bring about a reduction in command components at a time when
all alliance members are looking for ways to trim force commitments.
The Atlantic Command signifies the maritime aspect of the alliance. As
guarantors of the lines of communication, commerce, and the reinforcement of
Europe, North America remains the lifeblood of the Alliance in this respect
Additionally, as the custodian of the long range nuclear insurance policy
(SLBMs), it is clear that America still holds the ultimate security of Europe as
its foremost goal. Therefore, the Atlantic Command should, and will, remain
an equal partner in any collective arrangement between Europe and North
America.
The European Command should encompass all that is European and will
provide to the military organization a collective feel that it has never known
before. The command should rotate between European nations based upon
their commitment and contribution to the alliance. This would probably mean
that the leadership will fall to either the United Kingdom or Germany for the
time being, but might arguably act as a stimulus to bring France back into the
military structure of NATO. In any case, the Deputy European Commander
should be an American general of four star rank. This would reinforce a U.S.
commitment to the defense of Europe, in Europe, and forestall any
ethnocentric concerns Congress might have regarding American forces under a
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"foreign" command. Obviously, this change should take place after the normal
retirement of the incumbent SACUER in order to avoid cries that the United
States was subordinating itself in a role which it has maintained dominance
since World War II. Thereafter, the Deputy European Commander should
remain a junior four star Army General earmarked for future pivotal roles.
A link between the Atlantic Command and the European Command
would obviously need to be established in order to coordinate and command
the remaining nuclear weapons in Europe. A system of control, between
commands, would complement an improved plan for nuclear weapons
employment, which would provide a host state veto of nuclear weapons usage
from or onto its soil, as well as, a veto by the actual owner of the nuclear
armaments." This "double veto" procedure would ensure the control of
weapons is even more secure than exists now and would invoke their use only
in the event of an imminent invasion or the most critical of emergencies, and
then, only after considerable consultation. This plan would follow closely the
1990 NATO Declaration's assertion that nuclear armaments had truly become
"weapons of last resort." Additionally, this plan would serve to "Atlanticize"
the ultimate guarantee of the security of Europe, while building a deeper trust
among allies concurrently.




be the incorporation of the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force as a
component of a distinct European Multilateral Force under the joint control of
the European Command and the Western European Union (WEU). Doing so
would provide such a force with significantly enhanced credibility. This
structure would also allow the force to meet contingency operations within the
Treaty's limits as the ACE Mobile Force (or a portion thereof), or as a WEU
element in the event that out of area exigencies threaten European interests,
as in the last two Persian Gulf Wars.
Along with the establishment of this multilateral force would flow the
creation of a Multilateral Intelligence Command. This command would
provide direct support to the multilateral force using European national
technical means. It would also coordinate collection and analysis efforts
directly with parallel U.S. agencies in support of the Atlantic Council. Th's
structure would reduce the reliance of Europe upon American intelligence,
enhance trust among members of the European Command on intelligence
matters. and would organize better the vast array of intelligence information
available to all members of the alliance.
Outside of military measures to improve consultation in NATO, the
Council itself can develop confidence and trust by increasing the number of
Ministerial Sessions held each year from two to three. The augmentation of
an additional meeting would bring NATO Foreign Ministers together in an
effort to avoid agendas filled with nothing but declarations and resolutions, and
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provide much needed time for some true consultation betweL" parties on thL
essential issues.
The inclusion of Heads of State should be limited to one session per
year, unless circumstan cs require greater. The concentration on summITIry,
while visually attractive and often politically imperative, generaAy accomplishes
little of substance because of the limited time available, confined scope of
agreements, and the great aversion to the possibility of a summit failure.
Therefore, the greatest trust, cooperation, and consultation can occur at the
Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative levels and should be facilitated
by all means possible.
A second way to ensure that consultation and coordination in the
Council are improved would be to declare issues of c')mmol concern for the
Council, in which a majority decision by the members would be required for
agreement 3 A plan such as this would provide a di';tinct under-.anding on a
limited range of agreed upon i'.sues, but would also oring about a stronger
commitment to L4ooperation by all members of the Atlantic Alliance.
This landmark event would advance he alliance well beyond
consultation and toward the realm of collective decision-making. Obviously
th:.' plan would have to begin in a very limited nature, encompassing issues of
7 This idea is adapted from a Soviet plan to bring about mandatory
jurisdiction of the ICJ to the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council
on several basic issues in order to enhance tie effectiveness of the Court. See
Paul Lewis, "Woild Court Plan Meets Difficulties," New York Times, 24 June
1990, 3.
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the most basic effect However, if approached properly, this proposal could
serve as the basis for a truly new political and military security oider in
Eui ope.
Finally, the roles of Chairman of the North Atlantic Council and
Secretary General of NATO must be elevated to include the power which they
at present only hold in terms of protocol. If the Atlantic Alliance moves
closer to a bilateral relationship between North America and Europe, then the
position of Chairman and Secretary General must be strengthened significantly.
This is a serous imperative because there must be a power base, such as in
the European Commission, through which the interests of both sides of the
Atlantic partrership can be balanced equitably. Only through a strong NATO
structure Cdn this be achieved.
Measures of increased power for the Secretary General might include
the ability to act in a direct rele with the F. :sident of the EC Council, through
European political cooperation (EPC), on matters of common concern to the
EC and NATO. Issues of common concern might include Eastern Europe, the
Middle East, and other regional political issues. An enhanced Secretary
General would present a more united front in other European Security fora,
such as the CSCE, and in dealing with the Soviet Union on alliance issues.
All of these means would result in a broader base of power established
between Eur",., and North America and would invoke a legitii.'cy to NATO's
decision never before known.
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CONCLUSION
Many critics of NATO have suggested that other means can be utilized
or created to accomplish the tasks of NATO, or effect the same results in a
more efficient way.7' That may become true eventually. However, for the
present time, NATO is the only organization in being and capable of planning
for the defense of Western Europe, the Atlantic, and adjacent areas. The fact
that the United States does not have bilateral security treaties with any of the
West European members of NATO, or with Canada, makes NATO's necessity
if nothing more than a defensive arrangement that much more essential to
European security."
With the preceding argument in mind, one can assert that the
responsiveness of the Atlantic Alliance to the changing political environment
from its inception through its fourth decade has proven the success of its
founding ideals. This is evidenced by the enlightened spirit of each of the
documents analyzed throughout this paper: The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949;
the report of the Committee on Non-Military Cooperation of 1956; the Harmel
Report of 1967; the Ottawa Declaration of 1974; and the 1990 London
74See John Newhouse, "The Diplomatic Round," The New Yorker (27
August 1990): 78-89, for a commentary on diplomatic views of the relevance of
the EC and CSCE to European security.
See also John Palmer, Europe Without America: The Crisis in Atlantic
Relations (Oxford: Oxford University P:ess, 1987), 156-192, for suggestions on
Europe's future course after the expected demise of NATO.
"James Elster, NATO Defense Planning in The 1990's (Washington, DC:
Presearch, Inc., 1990), 2.
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Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Each of these
documents emerged during a significant stage of development for the alliance
and, it can be affirmed, they reflect the transformation of the alliance into a
truly international regime.
This paper has presented several conclusions regarding the nature of the
international system, the effectiveness of consultation as a regime-building
mechanism in NATO, and NATO competence as an integral aspect of an
overall European security regime. One final encompassing conclusion of this
paper is, first, considering: the increasing interdependence of the international
system; the significant role NATO has played in the maintenance of a stable
security regime for the last four decades; and the growing importance of a
European pillar to a collective security regime; there exists a role for an
organization designed to protect and advance the interests embraced by
Western States. Second, understanding: the experience of NATO as a cohesive
alliance; its constant efforts to advance the normative basis of consultation; and
its expression of a desire to act as a catalyst for change in Europe;
distinguishes the North Atlantic Alliance as a capable, versatile, and visionary
entity ready to seize the moment and place European security in the forefront
of any definition of a "New World Order." Upon reflection, one can say that
the sage advice of the great Atlanticist, Winston Churchill, noted on the first
page of this essay, has been understood and implemented rather well by the
North Atlantic Alliance.
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